This is an essay from my politics class, taught by Scott Thomas, on religion, ethnicity, nationality, and political violence.
When trying to understand religious violence, Western media often adopts a substantive and private conceptualization of religion. The following will argue that this framing misses some important functional aspects of religious violence and is prone to a ‘modernity–religion’ dichotomy (Waines, 2003), which overemphasizes a reactionary fundamentalism discourse when explaining religious violence. This essay is structured by first considering René Girard’s mimetic theory and Talal Asad’s critique of a substantive conception of religion. This is followed by a discussion of some BBC documentaries and popular series, and how they relate to these theoretical ideas. Finally, there is a comparative discussion of religious violence in Islam and Hinduism.
When considering the ideas of René Girard, we will skip to the interpretation by Giles Fraser (2001), which emphasizes the problem of reciprocal violence: Once, an act of violence in a community is retributed with another act of violence, a vicious cycle of never-ending violence forms. According to Girard, this can be mitigated if the initial violence, the ‘founding violence’, is manifested as a ritual where a scapegoat is sacrificed. Girard (1972, p.258) famously said, “violence exists at the heart of the sacred”. This is also evident from the etymology of the term ‘sacri-fice’ –“making sacred” (Thomas, 2014). As a result of this scapegoating mechanism, social order can be achieved by redirecting a ‘retributive instinct’ (Fraser, 2001) towards a common enemy, thereby fostering in-group cohesion (Tajfel, 1979). Girard (1972, p.132) highlights how the “arbitrary choice of the victim” remains hidden by institutionalizing the practice. This contrasts with related but differential ideas of directing violence towards someone breaking a religious taboo, where social order is strengthened by overtly punishing a transgressor (Douglas, 1966). A third mid-way interpretation highlights how “the hate which is produced by oppression comes to have a life of its own that is independent of the circumstances of its birth” (Fraser, 2001, p.10). Here, those oppressed overtly select the oppressor as a scapegoat, and initiate a sacralizing ‘founding violence’. If those initially oppressed become the dominant group, they may sustain this ‘resentment’ against their initial oppressors as a “theological imagination” despite the circumstances having changed.
Talad Asad (1993) argues that there can be no universal concept of religion. He critiques Clifford Geertz for putting too much emphasis on religious symbols without asking under “what (…) conditions [these] can actually produce religious dispositions?” (ibid., p.33). Drawing heavily from Michel Foucault (1975), Asad (1993) considers how power produces religious identity and truth through laws, sanctions, and disciplinary activities. In other words, (Geertz’) substantive definition of religion fails to capture the power and political dimension of religion. Asad also highlights how in post-Enlightenment Europe Christianity only has a legitimate space to ‘discipline’ on an individualized and private level, helping people come to the term with the human condition by creating an “explicable, justifiable and bearable” world (ibid., p.45). This anthropological construction of a non-public religion may adequately capture 19th-century Western Europe, yet does not generalize to other religious traditions and historical contexts.
One example where it does not generalize can be seen in the BBC video ‘On the Front Line - Absolute Truth’ (couldn't find a publically available link to the documentary) about the Catholic church in Zambia. In the video, the commentator explains how ‘witchcraft’ is a “superstitious practice”, whilst Catholicism is about “faith”. Yet, those who have taken witchcraft seriously (Douglas, 1966) understand that it facilitates social order. For example, if person A believes person B has wronged them, they can ask for B to be bewitched. If B becomes sick thereafter, this is seen as the Gods practicing justice. Considering the same example using mimetic theory, we may conceive that, not being able to resort to witchcraft, person A may take vengeance by attacking person B personally. Person B may reciprocate, thus potentially starting a vicious cycle of reciprocal violence. This characterization of witchcraft assumes violence, not peace, as a default understanding and highlights how ritualized (indirect) violence sustains social order by managing political conflicts.
Other examples of religious violence are the beheadings, flogging, and stoning described in the BBC documentary ‘God Fights Back’ (min 34) punishing murderers, thieves, and adulterers in 1979 Iran. One of the interviewees in the video says: “Culprits should be punished at once, and in front of everyone so that people learn a lesson”. This is indicative of the mechanism by which those transgressing a taboo are publicly punished (Douglas, 1966) and ‘disciplined’ (Foucault, 1975) – they should “learn a lesson”. The video depicts crowds watching and cheering on this ritual, thus it seems to capture the collective redirection of a ‘retributive instinct’ towards a common scapegoat (Fraser, 2001). So, in this case, the BBC documentary does capture a functional aspect of religious violence. Yet, it does so by situating this violence as a result of a substantive ‘modernity–religion’ dichotomy (Waines, 2003). The subsequent clip in the documentary depicts footage of ‘Sharia court’ being practiced in Sudan where people were “trialed without juries or defence lawyers” (min 35). Thus, the documentary implicitly juxtaposes religious courts with democratic ‘rights to a fair trial’. This juxtaposition frames religious violence as substantively opposed to modern values, and thus fuels a discourse, where the return to Islamic values equates to ‘fundamentalist’ values, leaving no space for Islamic modernism as developed by thinkers such as Muhammad Abduh.
For an example of Islamic modernism, we may consider the BBC drama series ‘My Jihad’. It features Nazir and Fahmida, who show what it means to navigate 21st-century Britain as devout Muslims. As the pronoun ‘my’ in the title suggests, the show focuses on the ‘inner Jihad’, which is about “striving in the path of God” (Morgan, 2010) by controlling one’s impulses. This contrasts with the interpretation of Jihad as a militant and public concept more dominant in the West (Esposito, 1992). The BBC series is right to point out that the vast majority of Muslims do not practice Jihad in a militant way. The series also captures some of the dynamics and challenges inherent in Islamic modernism, such as earning a living in a Capitalist system whilst not acting upon greed. Yet, the series focuses exclusively on religious practice within the private sphere. This agenda may make sense in contemporary Britain, where Islamophobia is widespread (Esposito and Kalin, 2011) and socially constructing a ‘private Islam’ is diplomatic. Yet, this non-political conceptualization does not generalize to Middle Eastern countries.
Let’s consider the assassination of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in 1989 depicted in ‘God Fights Back’. Using the ‘modernity–religion’ dichotomy, the documentary argues that the assassination reflects fundamentalist ideas that were reactionary to Sadat’s modernization program which promoted “advertisements showing American women using suggestive poses to sell them expensive products they did not need and could not afford” (Hodgson, 1996). The final part of this quote is useful because it highlights Egypt’s economic situation at the time: Sadat’s modernization programs failed to help the poorer sectors of the country. Consequently, through mosques and other institutions, Islam could engage in social policy by offering food and healthcare to those in need and simultaneously teach Islamic principles to large parts of the population. Hence, although Westernized modernization programs contributed to Islamic revivalism, this was not necessarily due to a substantive clash of modern vs religious values. Instead, one can adopt an economic and political lens, where Islamic institutions provided economic support and could ‘discipline’ through those institutions, thus swaying Egypt towards Islam.
Returning to mimetic theory, we might consider the assassination of Sadat as a ‘founding violence’ that was directed towards an oppressive state. There is a strong case to be made that ‘resentment’ (Fraser, 2001) towards the state in Egypt and many other Middle Eastern countries is rooted in their recent colonial history, where they do not feel represented by their rulers, as these have often been appointed by the West (Owen, 2004). Thus, was killing Sadat a means to sacralize Egypt’s political sovereignty from the West? This conceptualization is complicated, as killing Sadat is a rejection of the state’s authority but desiring political sovereignty in practice might imply nation-building. There is an open question of to which extent nation-building has to be done in a Western format. Yet, the focus of this essay is a critique of a substantive definition of religion, so let’s consider a final example.
Comparing religious violence across Islam and Hinduism illustrates the failure of a substantive definition of religion. In the case of Islam, religious violence is framed as a fundamentalist interpretation that commits terrorists to a ‘cosmic war’ of their traditional religious values vs modernity. This substantive and ‘securitized’ discourse (Thomas, 2014) fails to explain Hindu violence. Hinduism traditionally has no traditional ecclesiastical order or centralized religious authorities (Lipner, 2009), thus explaining why currently in India “mere suspicion that a Muslim or Christian is violating Hindu social codes is justification for violence” (Hansen and Roy, 2022, p.59), by an explanation of the return to fundamentalist ideas seems inappropriate. A better characterization of Hindu religious violence would consider the historical precedent of occupation by the Mughal Empire and British colonization in fuelling ‘resentment’ towards a common scapegoat, thereby strengthening in-group national identity, and how the BJP party re-publicized religion for their political interests (Cavanaugh, 2009).
To conclude, a substantive and private conceptualization of religion mischaracterizes the complexity of religious violence through a fundamentalist discourse. As a potential solution, we should take seriously the disciplinary processes in religious institutions, and how those institutions fit into the larger political-economic picture (Egypt example).
Regarding mimetic and other theories, we found examples of reciprocal violence (witchcraft), disciplining of taboo transgressing (Sharia law), how resentment towards an original oppressor can develop into ‘founding violence’ (assignation of Anwar Sadat) and becomes a ritualized public practice (Hindu nationalism). Yet, we did not find evidence for Girard’s (1972) point that the choice of a scapegoat for sacrifice is arbitrary. On the contrary, the historical particularities of colonial oppression seem to be crucial to further understand religious violence in the 21st century.
Bibliography
Asad, T., 1993. Genealogies of religion: Discipline and reasons of power in Christianity and Islam. JHU Press.
Douglas, M., 1966. Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo. London: Routledge.
Esposito, J.L. and Kalin, I., 2011. Islamophobia: The Challenge of Pluralism in the 21st Century. Oxford University Press, USA.
Foucault, M., 1975. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Random House.
Fraser, G., 2001. Christianity and Violence, London: Darton.
Hansen, T.B. and Roy, S., 2022. Saffron Republic: Hindu Nationalism and State Power in India. Cambridge University Press.
Lipner, J., 2009. Hindus: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices - 2nd Edition - Julius. Routledge.
Morgan, D., 2010. Essential Islam : a comprehensive guide to belief and practice. Santa Barbara, Calif. : Praeger/ABC-CLIO.
Owen, R., 2004. State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East. 3rd ed. London:
Tajfel, H., 1979. Individuals and groups in social psychology*. British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology [Online], 18(2), pp.183–190. Available from: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8260.1979.tb00324.x.
Thomas, S.M., 2014. Culture, religion and violence: Rene Girard’s mimetic theory. Millennium, 43(1), pp.308-327.
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